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THE SEC'S AUDITOR INDEPENDENCE RULE:
MISSING THE BOAT ON INDEPENDENCE
Mark A. Gullotta*
I. INTRODUCTION
The Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") is the
governmental agency responsible for the regulation of securi-
ties traded on public exchanges.1 Recently, the SEC amended
Rule 2-01 of Regulation S-X2 and Item 9 of Schedule 14A,3 ef-
fective February 5, 2001, to update the independence stan-
dards for auditors of public companies in the United States.4
The change is meant to modernize the independence rules
with which audit firms must comply in order to audit annual
financial statements of publicly traded companies.'
At the heart of the debate is whether accounting firms
should be permitted to provide "non-audit" services to their
clients.6 Under the amended rules, the ability of accounting
firms to perform such services will be greatly limited This
change will have significant ramifications for the accounting
industry, the public companies that rely on their expertise,
and the securities markets within the United States.
* Articles Editor, Santa Clara Law Review, Volume 42. C.P.A.,
J.D./M.B.A. candidate, Santa Clara University School of Law and Leavey School
of Business; B.S.C., Santa Clara University.
1. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, title I, § 4, 48 Stat. 885
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78d (1994 & Supp. V 1999)).
2. 17 C.F.R. § 210.2-01 (2001) (regulating accountant qualifications).
3. Id. § 240.14a-101 (mandating disclosures by independent public ac-
countants in proxy statements).
4. See Revision of the Commission's Auditor Independence Requirements,
65 Fed. Reg. 76,008 (Dec. 5, 2000).
5. See id. at 76,008. A publicly traded company is one whose securities are
traded on a national public exchange. For procedural requirements on the reg-
istration of securities to be traded on a national exchange, see 15 U.S.C. §781.
6. See William R. McLucas et al., The Battle Over Auditor Independence
and the SEC's Recent Rule Proposal, 2 32ND ANN. INST. ON SEC. REG. 459, 482
(2000).
7. See id.
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The SEC's response to a perceived problem with auditor
independence is misdirected. Private firms should not per-
form audits at all. The SEC's response should instead target
the heart of problem. The government, rather than private,
profit-minded participants, should perform audits. Only then
can independence be assured.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934
Enacted partly in response to the stock market crash in
1929, the purpose of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
("Exchange Act") was to restore faith in the security exchange
markets.8 One result of the Exchange Act is that all public
companies are required to obtain independent audits of their
year-end financial statements.9 To prevent companies from
manipulating their financial reporting, an accounting firm is
asked to review the reports and issue its own report stating,
in effect, that the report is reasonably accurate. 10 Thus, in-
vestors in public securities are not forced to rely solely on the
company's own assurances.
One of the most important requirements of an audit is
that an independent accountant, who is free from any bias in
favor of the audited company, must perform it." The reason
for this requirement is simple: the auditor is issuing an opin-
ion regarding whether the financial statements are materi-
ally accurate. Therefore, it is important that the opinion be
objective and unbiased.'2 Even if an auditor who was not in-
dependent could be objective, investors and others relying on
the audits might not be so easily persuaded.'3
B. The Audit Process
All public companies are required by the SEC to report
their financial statements and have those statements
8. See 15 U.S.C. § 78b (1994).
9. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1 (Supp. V 1999).
10. See id.
11. See PHILIP L. DEFLIESE ET AL., MONTGOMERY'S AUDITING 12-17 (10th
ed. 1983).
12. See Revision of the Commission's Auditor Independence Requirements,




audited.4 Under the current model, public companies obtain
and pay an accounting firm to perform an independent
audit. 5 After the audit is complete the auditors issue a letter
or opinion stating whether the financial statements materi-
ally conform with Generally Accepted Accounting Principles
("GAAP"). 5 If the auditors find that the financial statements
do not conform to GAAP, and the public company refuses to
make the necessary changes to bring them into conformity,
the auditors will issue a letter to that effect, stating the defi-
ciencies.'7
Auditors are legally accountable for their work. 8 They
can be sued both by investors that relied on the auditors
opinion, and by the SEC.'9 Violations of the Exchange Act
carry penalties including fines, revocation of license to prac-
tice accounting, and criminal penalties."0
Much of what an audit requires is a review by the audi-
tors of the accounting principles' used by the company and
an analysis of the estimates made in preparation of the com-
pany's financial statements.2 The application of these princi-
ples depends on the particular business situation. Estimates
can vary greatly as well. Auditors interview management,
confer with outside sources (regarding such topics as valua-
tion), and look to industry standards to determine if the prin-
ciples applied and the estimates made are reasonable.2'
14. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1.
15. See Revision of the Commission's Auditor Independence Requirements,
65 Fed. Reg. at 76,008 n.8.
16. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1.
Materiality is the amount by which a financial statement can be errone-
ous but not cause an investor to change his mind regarding investing in the
company. This standard of review is intended to prevent audits from becoming
too costly and time consuming. See id.
17. See id.
18. See DEFLIESE ET AL., supra note 11, at 133.
19. See id. at 143.
20. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(d).
21. The Financial Accounting Standards Board ("FASB") establishes the ac-
counting principles used by public companies. These accounting principles are
known collectively as generally accepted accounting principles ("GAAP"). Not
only is a public company required to adhere to these principles when preparing
their financial statements, but they also must abide by SEC rules. While the
FASB establishes the standards of accounting, they do so only at the pleasure of
the SEC. The SEC has full authority to enforce their reporting requirements,
as well as any violations of GAAP. See generally 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1.
22. See DEFLIESE ET AL., supra note 11, at 35.
23. See id. at 190.
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If an auditor's judgment is biased and unreasonable es-
timates are reported to the public, investors, as well as any-
one else in the financial community who relies on the esti-
mates, will likely make poor investment decisions. 24  If
investors or the financial community begin to believe that the
financial statements of public companies are not accurate,
they would, over time, be less likely to invest in the stock
market. 25 This lack of faith and withholding of investments
would eventually destroy the financial markets in this coun-
try.2 It is this situation which the SEC is attempting to pre-vent with the auditor-independence amendments.27
C. Establishing Independence Standards
State boards of accountancy, state legislatures, bar asso-
ciations and professional organizations, such as the American
Institute for Certified Public Accountants ("AICPA"), gener-
ally establish standards for independence." Most recently,
the AICPA established the Independence Standards Board("ISB"), which seeks "to provide leadership not only in im-
proving current auditor independence requirements, but also
in establishing and maintaining a body of independent stan-
dards applicable to the auditors of all Commission regis-
trants."29 In November 2000, after much criticism by the
AICPA, the SEC in an unusual move acted in place of these
standard-setting bodies and issued the amendment."0
D. The Changing Accounting Industry
One catalyst for the SEC's decision to enact the amend-
ments is the changing dynamic of the accounting industry."
Over the past two decades the eight largest accounting firms
24. See McLucas et al., supra note 6, at 468.
25. See id.
26. See Revision of the Commission's Auditor Independence Requirements,
65 Fed. Reg. 76,008, 76,012 (Dec. 5, 2000).
27. See id.
28. See McLucas et al., supra note 6, at 468. See also DEFLIESE ET AL., su-
pra note 11, at 66.
29. Commission Statement of Policy on the Establishment and Improve-
ment of Standards Related to Auditor Independence, Securities Act Release No.
33-7507, 66 SEC Doc. (CCH) 1110, 1112 (Feb. 18, 1998). Commission regis-
trants are companies that have registered their securities with the SEC.
30. See McLucas et al., supra note 6, at 468.
31. See Revision of the Commission's Auditor Independence Requirements,
65 Fed. Reg. at 76,013.
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have consolidated down to only five, also known as the "Big
Five."" The Big Five perform the lion's share of audits for
public companies in this country.33 Smaller, or regional firms
also perform audits for public companies. However, most
small firms do not perform this type of audit because of the
high risk of litigation involved.34
The reduction of firms over the past two decades is the
result of mergers between the largest accounting firms. As
companies began to operate globally and sell goods and serv-
ices to markets all around the world, accounting firms have
also felt the need to expand. Mergers have allowed account-
ing firms to increase market share, and to be more competi-
tive in the U.S. and abroad.
E. Non-Audit Services
While accounting firms continue to provide traditional
services such as tax services,36 many have become more multi-
disciplinary and now offer new types of services to their audit
clients.3 ' These new services include internal audits, pension
services, financial consulting, administrative services, actu-
arial services and marketing functions, among others. 8 More
32. The term "Big Five" refers to the largest five accounting firms: Pricewa-
terhouseCoopers L.L.P., Arthur Anderson L.L.P., Ernst & Young L.L.P., KPMG
Peat Marwick L.L.P. and Deloitte & Touche L.L.P. See id.
33. Comparing accounting firms with at least 20 SEC audit clients, the Big
Five firms had 12,769 SEC audit clients, or 92%, of a total of 13,924 clients. See
Independence Focus Shifts to States, PUB. ACCT. REP., Sept. 15, 2000, at 4 tbl.
34. It is also important to note that many public companies prefer to use the
Big Five accounting firms because of their reputation. Most large companies
find it advantageous to be associated with well known and reputable firms.
This association, in turn, lends credence to companies' financial statements.
35. In 1989, Touche Ross and Deloitte Haskins & Sells merged to form De-
loitte & Touche. See DELOITTE & TOUCHE LLP, OUR HISTORY: THE 1980S: A
NEW STYLE OF MANAGEMENT, at
httpJ/www.dttus.com/us/who/history/1 9 80s.htm (last modified Dec. 28, 2000).
In 1989, Ernst & Whinney and Arthur Young merged to form Ernst & Young.
See ERNST & YOUNG, OUR HISTORY: TWO MEN. ONE VISION., at
httpJ/www.ey.com/global/gcr.nsf/International/History---Careers--
Ernst_%26Young (visited Nov. 17, 2001). In 1998, Coopers & Lybrand and
Pricewaterhouse merged to form Pricewaterhouscoopers. See
PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, OUR HISTORY, at
http://www.pwcglobal.congx/eng/about/press-rm/fact.html (visited Oct. 9,
2001).
36. See McLucas et al., supra note 6, at 486.
37. See Revision of the Commission's Auditor Independence Requirements,
65 Fed. Reg. 76,008, 76, 013 (Dec. 5, 2000).
38. See id.
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recently, accounting firms have attempted to expand their
services to include certain legal services.39 However, they are
currently prevented from practicing law in the United States
by the American Bar Association."
Revenues of the Big Five in the United States for man-
agement advisory and similar services amounted to more
than $15 billion in 1999.' The revenue for such services is
now estimated to constitute half of the total revenues for
these firms.42 In contrast, these services provided only thir-
teen percent of total revenues in 1981." The average growth
rate for revenues from management advisory and similar
services is twenty-six percent per year, whereas growth in
audit services has averaged nine percent per year in audit
services.44
This means that accounting firms are relying more on
non-audit services performed for audit and non-audit clients.
Currently, there is no evidence that this trend will slow in the
future. However, the SEC fears that as auditors receive more
fees from clients for non-audit services, clients will exercise
economic leverage over auditing firms to influence their
opinion on the financial statements.45
F. The Changing Financial Markets
The operation of securities and financial markets is also
changing. Public companies are coming under heightened
pressure to meet earnings expectations set by analysts. 46 This
pressure has led to increased emphasis on corporate earnings
in recent years.4' For example, stock prices routinely rise and
39. Hence, accounting firms' management consulting practices have ex-
panded far beyond the skills required for audit support and the traditional ar-
eas related to financial planning and controls including investment banking and
legal services. See id. at 76,024-26.
40. According to the ABA model rules, attorneys who partner with non-
lawyers, such as in an accounting firm, are prohibited from the practice of law.
See MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY R. 5.4 (2000).
41. See Revision of the Commission's Auditor Independence Requirements,




45. See id. at 76,014.
46. See id. at 76,013-14.
47. See C. Terry Grant, et al., Earnings Management and the Abuse of Ma-




fall based on whether or not a company meets its projected
earnings. Often a company's stock price will fall dramatically
if it fails to meet earnings per share by as little as one cent
per share. This trend is causing public companies to manage
their earnings. A public company manages its earnings by
making financial reporting decisions based on the amount of
earnings or losses it wants to report for a particular period.48
However, accounting decisions should be made on managerial
estimates and business forecasts without regard to what
profit or loss the company will have. The pressure to manage
earnings increases the likelihood that a company will make
estimates that border on the unreasonable.49 These situations
lead to intense pressure on auditors to go along with the es-
timates, although they may have some doubt as to their rea-
sonableness. The SEC fears that as these situations become
more common, there is a greater likelihood that an auditor's
independence may become impaired. °
G. The Appearance of Independence
Most of the controversy over the new rules comes from
the increased importance of "independence in appearance.
As auditors offer an increasing amount of non-audit services
to their audit clients, it is feared that the appearance of inde-
pendence and objectivity will erode, even if actual independ-
ence does not. "
The SEC claims that they are less concerned with
whether an auditor would actually allow himself or herself to
be influenced by an audit client, and are more concerned with
the appearance of bias to the public.53 The SEC, in the final
draft of the rule amendment, expressed this sentiment.4 The
concern is that auditors will be seen both by themselves and
48. See id.
49. See Revision of the Commission's Auditor Independence Requirements,
65 Fed. Reg. 76,008, 76,014.
50. See id.
51. The Revision of the Commission's Auditor Independence Requirements
makes auditor independence in appearance as important as independence in
fact. See id. at 76,030. Under this concept, independence is impaired when it
would appear to a reasonable investor that the person is not independent, even
though, in fact, he is. See id.
52. See Revision of the Commission's Auditor Independence Requirements,
65 Fed. Reg. at 76,030.
53. See id. at 76,030-31.
54. See id.
22720011
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by others not as exacting, skeptical professionals who must be
satisfied before signing off on the financial statements, but
more like any other service vendor who must satisfy the client
in order to make the sale.5
As evidence of this "growing public concern," the SEC
points to a number of reports stating that the increasing vol-
ume of non-audit services has the potential to compromise
auditor independence.56 "We act on the basis of our evalua-
tion of the potential impact of non-audit relationships on
audit objectivity and also on the basis of indications that in-
vestor confidence is in fact affected by reasonable concerns
about non-audit services compromising audit objectivity.""
Similarly, the AICPA cites a study it commissioned that
shows concern for "[r]elationships [that] could 'erode auditor
independence."'' 8 It is important to note that nowhere in the
SEC's ruling does it state that auditor independence is cur-
rently in jeopardy.
H. Restrictions on Non-Audit Services
With the mindset that non-audit services create economic
incentives that may inappropriately influence the audit, the
SEC amended the existing independence rules, bypassing the
private standard-setting bodies. 9 Among the aspects of the
independence rules that were "modernized" were the defini-
tions regarding which individuals were subject to the inde-
pendence rules in the first place.6" These rules, for the most
part, were accepted by the accounting community as a change
for the better. However, the main thrust of the amendment,
which was the subject of much controversy, was the estab-
lishment of a non-exhaustive list of non-audit services that, if
engaged in by the auditors, would be an outright impairment
of independence. These services are summarized as follows:
1. Bookkeeping Services
An auditor's independence is deemed to be impaired
55. See id.
56. See McLucas et al., supra note 6, at 467.
57. Revision of the Commission's Auditor Independence Requirements, 65
Fed. Reg. at 76,014.
58. Id. (emphasis added).
59. See McLucas at al., supra note 6, at 468.
60. See Revision of the Commission's Auditor Independence Requirements,
65 Fed. Reg. at 76,031-32.
228 [Vol. 42
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when the auditor performs bookkeeping services for an audit
client, with certain exceptions.6'
2. Financial Information Systems Design and
Implementation
The SEC believes that providing certain information
technology services to an audit client would impair the ac-
countant's independence, with some exceptions.
61. See 17 C.F.R. § 210.2-01(c)(4)(i) (2001).
[P]roviding bookkeeping services for an audit client impairs the audi-
tor's independence because the auditor will be placed in the position of
auditing the firm's work when auditing the client's financial state-
ments. It is hard to maintain the requisite objectivity about one's or
one's firm's own work. This is especially true where finding an error
would raise questions about the adequacy of the bookkeeping services
provided by the firm. In addition, keeping the books is a management
function, the performance of which leads to an inappropriate mutuality
of interests between the auditor and the audit client.
Revision of the Commission's Auditor Independence Requirements, 65 Fed. Reg.
at 76,043-44. The new rules adopt an exception from the bookkeeping restric-
tion for emergency or other unusual situations, provided that the accountant
does not act as a manager or make any managerial decisions. See 17 C.F.R. §
210.2-01(c)(4)(i)(B)(1). An example is the unexpected resignation of a company's
comptroller at the end of the year. See Revision of the Commission's Auditor
Independence Requirements, 65 Fed. Reg. at 76,044.
62. See 17 C.F.R. § 210.2-01(c)(4)(ii). The rule imposes five conditions before
an audit firm can perform Financial Information Systems Design and Imple-
mentation services and remain independent. See id. § 210.2-01(c)(4)(ii)(B)(1)-
(5). These "conditions ... are intended to reduce the likelihood that the auditor
will be placed in a position of making, and then auditing, managerial decisions."
Revision of the Commission's Auditor Independence Requirements, 65 Fed. Reg.
at 76,045.
(1)The first condition is that the "audit client's management has ac-
knowledged in writing to the accounting firm and the audit client's audit com-
mittee ... the audit client's responsibility to establish and maintain a system of
internal accounting controls .... ." 17 C.F.R. § 210.2-01(c)(4)(ii)(B)(1). "This
condition makes clear that this statutory responsibility cannot be shifted to the
accounting firm." Revision of the Commission's Auditor Independence Re-
quirements, 65 Fed. Reg. at 76,045.
The second and third conditions complement each other:
(2) The audit client's management designates a competent employee
or employees, preferably within senior management, with the responsi-
bility to make all management decisions with respect to the design and
implementation of the hardware or software system;
(3) The audit client's management makes all management decisions
with respect to the design and implementation of the hardware or soft-
ware system including, but not limited to, decisions concerning the sys-
tems to be evaluated and selected, the controls and system procedures
to be implemented, the scope and timetable of system implementation,
and the testing, training and conversion plans.
17 C.F.R. § 210.2-01(c)(4)(ii)(B)(2)-(3). "These conditions are intended to ensure
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3. Appraisal or Valuation Services and Fairness
Opinions'
With some exceptions,64 an accountant is not considered
to be independent if the accountant provides appraisal or
valuation services, or any service involving a fairness opin-
61ion.
4. Actuarial Services
Accountants who provide actuarially oriented advisory
services involving the determination of insurance company
policy reserves and related accounts are deemed not to be in-
dependent under the new rules."
that an audit client that receives information technology services from its audi-
tor does not delegate to its auditor responsibility for 'management decisions'
relating to the design and implementation of the system." Revision of the
Commission's Auditor Independence Requirements, 65 Fed. Reg. at 76,045.
The fourth and fifth conditions:
(4) The audit client's management evaluates the adequacy and re-
sults of the design and implementation of the hardware or software
system; and
(5) The audit client's management does not rely on the accountant's
work as the primary basis for determining the adequacy of its internal
controls and financial reporting systems.
17 C.F.R. § 210.2-01(c)(4)(ii)(B)(4)-(5).
63. "Appraisal and valuation services include any process of valuing assets,
both tangible and intangible, or liabilities. Fairness opinions are opinions that
an accounting firm provides on the adequacy of consideration in a transaction."
See Revision of the Commission's Auditor Independence Requirements, 65 Fed.
Reg. at 76,046.
64. See id.
The rule also contains an exception for appraisal or valuation serv-
ices where the accounting firm reviews and reports on work done by
the audit client itself or an independent, third-party specialist em-
ployed by the audit client, and the audit client or specialist provides the
primary support for the balance recorded in the client's financial
statements. In those instances, because a third party or the audit cli-
ent is the source of the financial information subject to the review or
audit, the accountant will not be reviewing or auditing his or her own
work.
Another exception allows accountants to continue to value an audit
client's pension, other post-employment benefit, or similar liabilities, so
long as the audit client has determined and taken responsibility for all
significant assumptions and data underlying the valuation. Account-
ants historically have provided pension assistance to their audit cli-
ents, and if appropriate persons at the audit client determine the un-
derlying assumptions and data, thus the SEC believes that
independence will not be impaired.
Id. (footnote omitted).
65. See 17 C.F.R. § 2 10.2-01(c)(4)(iii).
66. See id. § 210.2-01(c)(4)(iv). The rule states that an auditor's independ-
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5. Internal Audit Services
An auditor's independence is impaired if she performs
more than forty percent of the audit client's internal audit
work related to internal accounting controls, financial sys-
tems, or financial statements, unless the audit client has
$200 million or less in assets.67
6. Management Functions
An accountant's independence is impaired with respect to
an audit client for which the accountant acts, temporarily or
permanently, as a director, officer or employee, or performs
decision-making, supervisory or ongoing monitoring func-
tions.68
7. Human Resources
The SEC has adopted most of the AICPA's rules disal-
lowing certain executive recruiting and human resource
services for clients.69
ence is impaired if the audit firm provides certain actuarially oriented advisory
services involving the determination of insurance company policy reserves and
related accounts, unless three conditions are met:
(1) The audit client uses its own actuaries or third-party actuaries
to provide management with the primary actuarial capabilities;
(2) Management accepts responsibility for any significant actuarial
methods and assumptions; and
(3) The accountant's involvement is not continuous.
Id. § 210.2-01(c)(4)(iv)(A). "All of these conditions are designed to ensure
that the accountant does not assume a management function for the audit
client." Revision of the Commission's Auditor Independence Requirements,
65 Fed. Reg. at 76,047.
67. See 17 C.F.R. § 210.2-01(c)(4)(v).
68. See id. § 210.2-01(c)(4)(vi).
69. See id. § 210.2-01(c)(4)(vii). SEC commentary on this rule states:
[A]n accountant's independence would be impaired if the accountant:
(a) Searches for or seeks out prospective candidates for managerial, ex-
ecutive or director positions with audit clients; (b) engages in psycho-
logical testing, or other formal testing or evaluation programs; (c) un-
dertakes reference checks of prospective candidates for executive or
director positions with audit clients; (d) acts as a negotiator on the
audit client's behalf, such as in determining position, status or title,
compensation, fringe benefits, or other conditions of employment; or (e)
recommends, or advises an audit client to hire, a specific candidate for
a specific job.
Revision of the Commission's Auditor Independence Requirements, 65 Fed. Reg.
at 76,049 (footnotes omitted).
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8. Broker-Dealer Services
An accountant's independence is impaired if the account-
ant is connected with the audit client as an underwriter or
promoter of the company's securities. °
9. Legal Services
The SEC finds that conflict exists between the role of an
independent auditor and the role of an attorney.71 Therefore
an accountant is not independent from the audit client if an
accountant provides any legal services where the provider of
the services must be admitted to practice before the courts of
a jurisdiction within the United States.72
I. The Accounting Firms and Public Companies
In contrast to the fears expressed by the SEC, a study
commissioned by the AICPA does not seem to support the
lack of faith in the existing audit independence rules. This
study culminated in a two-part report by Earnscliffe Research
& Communications ("Earnscliffe Report") based on research
to ascertain opinions on the current and future state of the
audit process.73 The report was based on interviews and a se-
ries of hypothetical questions. 4 Those interviewed included
chief executive officers and chief financial officers of public
companies, audit committee chairs, 5 buy-side investment
70. See 17 C.F.R. § 210.2-01(c)(4)(viii).
71. See Revision of the Commission's Auditor Independence Requirements,
65 Fed. Reg. at 76,050.
72. See 17 C.F.R. § 210.2-01(c)(4)(ix). No examples were given, as what con-
stitutes the practice of law varies from state to state. See ALAN W. SCHEFLIN,
PROFESSIONAL ETHICS FOR CALIFORNIA LAWYERS (forthcoming 2001) (noting
that the rule excludes those practices that would constitute the practice of law
in any U.S. jurisdiction, not just the jurisdiction one was in at the time).
73. EARNSCLIFFE RESEARCH & COMMUNICATIONS, RESEARCH INTO
PERCEPTIONS OF AUDITOR INDEPENDENCE AND OBJECTIVITY - PHASE I (1999)
[hereinafter EARNSCLIFFE, PHASE I] (report to the U.S. Independence Standards
Board), available at http://www.cpaindependence.org; EARNSCLIFFE RESEARCH
& COMMUNICATIONS, RESEARCH INTO PERCEPTIONS OF AUDITOR
INDEPENDENCE AND OBJECTIVITY - PHASE 11 (2000) (report to the U.S. Inde-
pendence Standards Board), available at http://www.cpaindependence.org.
74. See EARNSCLIFFE, PHASE I, supra note 73. A few of the questions in-
clude "How would you characterize the relationship between most public com-
panies and their auditors? What about your approach?," "Based on what you
know, are current prohibitions governing the relationship between audit firms
and their clients appropriate?" and "Over and above the prohibitions, are there
adequate safeguards to help prevent impairment?" Id. at 49-50.
75. An audit committee is a board committee who has the responsibility of
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analysts," sell-side investment analysts, audit partners, and
regulators.77 The report focused on several specific areas of
concern, as discussed in the following subsections.
1. The Overall Health of Financial Reporting
"The general consensus seemed to be that there might be
a slight deterioration of integrity in auditor independence
over time, but no more in the financial business sector than in
society as a whole." 8 Nonetheless, interviewees felt that "liti-
gation pressures served as a deterrent for those who might be
inclined otherwise."79 Moreover, the participants stated that
they "looked upon auditors as an additional check to ensure
that their companies were reporting appropriately, to save
embarrassment down the road." ° The report added that for
most participants audited financials were a basic require-
ment, but that "their role in investment decisions was seen as
providing confirmation and reassurance about information
that was already in the public domain." 1
Even though there was concern about existing independ-
ence issues among executives and analysts, most concluded
that a debate about standards for auditor independence was
legitimate.82 On the other hand, roughly 30% of the non-
regulators and a majority of the auditors felt "that the profile,
tone and the tenor of the debate might serve to frighten more
than enlighten investors."83 These comments were meant to
be a warning sign that the debate on impairment of inde-
pendence could become a self-fulfilling prophecy.
hiring the auditors as well as dealing with any findings from an audit. See 1
AICPA PROF'L STANDARDS, AU § 380.01 (American Inst. of Certified Pub. Ac-
countants 2001).
76. An investment analyst is "somebody who is employed by a stock ex-
change business to research other companies and areas of investment for cli-
ents." See ENCARTA WORLD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (Anne H. Soukahov ed.,
1999), http://dictionary.msn.com/find/entry.asp?refid=1861692585 (last visited
Oct. 9, 2001).
77. See EARNSCLIFFE, PHASE I, supra note 73, at 2.
78. Id. at 4.
79. Id. at 5.
80. Id. at 6.
81. Id.
82. See id. at 7.
83. See EARNSCLIFFE, PHASE I, supra note 73, at 7.
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2. The Broad View of Auditor independence
When asked questions regarding auditor independence
specifically, the respondents stated that generally they had a
positive view of auditors themselves and of their job perform-
ance. 84 A "vast majority" believed that auditors currently
meet a high standard of objectivity and independence."
At the same time, the same respondents were concerned
that the pressures impairing objectivity and independence
were increasing with time."
3. Current Safeguards for Auditor Independence
When the researchers asked about the effectiveness of
the current safeguards, the responses varied depending upon
who was asked. The auditors seemed to think that the pres-
ent safeguards were adequate and only needed fine tuning
from time to time." In contrast, the regulators, i.e., the SEC,
felt that the current accounting firm model seemed funda-
mentally unworkable, that the safeguards were inadequate,
and that stronger safeguards were needed to protect investor
confidence."
When the same questions were asked of chairmen of
audit committees, chief executive officers, and chief financial
officers, the responses were mixed. The audit committee
chairs saw the independence safeguards as works in progress,
which required constant attention.9" Executive officers felt
the current safeguards were appropriate, but were inclined to
the idea that more guidance might be useful.9
Analysts responded that they "felt the combination of
safeguards, laws, regulations and litigation pressures were
necessary," but acknowledged that due to human temptation,
there is always a risk auditors may be influenced to some de-
gree." The researchers noted that while most surveyed had
84. See id. at 8.
85. See id.
86. See id. at 9. Only 10% of the respondents thought an actual independ-
ence problem exists, and 20% believed a perception problem exists. See id. at
10.
87. See id. at 19.
88. See id.






opinions on the safeguards, most respondents could not ar-
ticulate them.93
4. Non-Audit Service in Focus
Respondents believed that the areas that caused the most
concern were consulting and non-audit services (the fees from
which greatly exceeded audit fees) or any situations where
non-audit fees routinely exceed audit fees in general.94 Re-
spondents were also concerned about situations where a par-
ticular non-audit service is important to an audit firm, or
where a particular client is important to an audit partner
(i.e., either for their reputation or the fees the client gener-
ated).95 However, it is important to note that the respondents
generally felt that as long as audits were being performed by
the private sector, the auditors must be afforded a certain de-
gree of latitude in terms of growing their businesses, espe-
cially due to the competition in the industry.96
J. Harsh words from an ex-Commissioner of the SEC
Showing a bias on the subject, ex-SEC Commissioner
Bevis Longstreth made the following comment during the last
phase of SEC hearings before issuing the final amendment:
This battle, and it is, clearly a battle, pits a legally cre-
ated monopoly, dominated by five global accounting firms,
against the SEC. The former, representing solely their
private business interests, reject further restrictions on
the free play of those interests. The SEC, acting upon the
need for greater independence, a need long recognized by
virtually every group assigned the task of considering the
issue (and there have been many), has proposed a rule to
meet this need.
Given the sharpness of the debate, and the transparency
in this battle of the private vs. the public interest, there is
more at stake in the outcome than just the independence
of the auditors. The independence of the SEC, itself, is
being challenged as the accounting firms do all they can,
on Capitol Hill, and throughout the business community,
to bring political pressure to bear against a proposal that
93. See id. at 20.
94. See id. at 23.
95. See EARNSCLIFFE, PHASE I, supra note 73, at 24.
96. See id. at 25.
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can not be defeated by argument on the merits.... In the
tumult of the moment, the leaders of the accounting pro-
fession seem almost to have forgotten their origins as a
profession granted exclusive rights, and reciprocal duties,
to perform a vital public service. Although affected by the
public interest as much as any public utility, the profes-
sion seems to want freedom from serious oversight or con-
straint. It won't wash. Not in a country where check and
balance is king.9v
Clearly this statement illustrates the animosity the SEC
feels towards the accounting profession.98 It also helps to
shed light on the SEC's motivations, besides what is blatantly
written in the amendment.
III. IDENTIFICATION OF THE LEGAL PROBLEM
As noted above, the SEC believes that there is a genuine
problem with auditor independence. 9  As expressed by ex-
SEC Commissioner Bevis Longstreth, the SEC felt it could
not wait for accountants to develop their own policies."'
However, the question is whether the rules enacted by the
SEC in regard to non-audit services are the proper steps to
take.
As this comment will discuss, the SEC allowed its judg-
ment to be blurred and amended the existing independence
rules, which will hurt, rather than protect, investor confi-
dence and the United States' securities markets.' As compe-
tition among companies increases and as businesses become
more global, it is crucial that companies have unrestricted ac-
cess to the expertise auditors can provide.' Will the benefits
of restricting auditors from providing non-audit services out-
weigh the costs of lost expertise and reduction of worldwide
competitiveness? No. In fact, the cost to public companies
will surely be greater than the benefits realized by the public.
If the amendments adopted by the SEC are too costly, what is
the right solution? What type of reform should the SEC im-
plement to protect the public's confidence in audit opinions
97. Bevis Longstreth, Testimony before the SEC (Sept. 9, 2000), available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s7l300/testimony/longstla.pdf.
98. See McLucas et al., supra note 6, at 504-05.
99. See supra Part II.
100. See Longstreth, supra note 97.
101. See infra Part W.A.





It is clear that the SEC believes that the accounting pro-
fession is denying the existence of a serious problem, for self-
interested purposes, as evidenced by the comments by SEC
members in the Earnscliffe Report and by former SEC Com-
missioner Longstreth made during the SEC hearings.' Per-
haps the SEC's desire to police the accounting firms has
blinded them to a number of countervailing issues.
A. Independence in Appearance Doesn't Seem to be a
Problem
The SEC explains in the auditor independence amend-
ments that they are concerned with the appearance of inde-
pendence of auditors.0 4 The regulators interviewed in the
Earnscliffe report repeat this sentiment. The concern
would appear to be sincere except for the fact that former
SEC Commissioner Bevis Longstreth's comment makes the
more stringent regulations seem like a vendetta."6 At the
very least, the comments bring into question the SEC's mo-
tives for making this amendment. 7
If the SEC has a genuine concern, this begs the question,
where are they getting their data? Nothing is mentioned in
the ruling.08 The SEC held hearings after issuing the pro-
posed amendments, but the only explanation they gave for
not allowing time for the AICPA or the ISB to act was a
claim '9 that the private bodies were not dealing with the
problem of auditor independence."0
Regardless of what the SEC believes, the year-long study
by Earnscliffe Research paints a different picture. It found
that the independence rules are working and most of the peo-
103. See supra Parts II.I-J.
104. See supra Part II.G.
105. See supra Part I..
106. See supra Part II.J.
107. The SEC's ruling does not explain why oversight of auditor independ-
ence cannot be left to the private sector, which has been the model for many
years. See McLucas et al., supra note 6, at 469-70.
108. See generally Revision of the Commission's Auditor Independence Re-
quirements, 65 Fed. Reg. 76,008 (Dec. 5, 2000).
109. See supra Part II.C.
110. See supra Part II.G.
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ple interviewed had confidence in the system.11' Furthermore,
during the SEC hearings, the amendment generated primar-
ily negative responses. Thus, the SEC's contention that the
current state of auditor independence apparently is deterio-
rating and is need of reform, appears to be unsupported.
However, one underlying area of concern is that even
though the regulations are currently effective, generally all
(except the auditors) feel that independence might be com-
promised in the future."' Therefore, the system in place does,
in fact, need reform, however not necessarily to the extent
proposed by the SEC.
B. The Negative Effects of the SEC's Amendments
The SEC and the U.S. Congress have allowed private
standard-setting bodies to make policy in the past because
such organizations are in a much better position to evaluate
and proscribe the independence rules. "3 Organizations such
as the ISB are better equipped to set standards for independ-
ence that balance the need to be flexible in order to meet the
needs of the public against the need for independence in ap-
pearance and in fact."'
In its haste, the SEC made amendments to the independ-
ence rules that will actually be detrimental to public compa-
nies, in contrast to what the SEC would have these compa-
nies believe. The restrictions placed on offering non-audit
services to audit clients will prevent public companies from
gaining access to the wealth of information and services that
auditors can provide."5 Many efficiencies of scale are created
when auditors are allowed to do more than just audits for a
company. Because an audit involves obtaining an under-
standing of how a company operates,"6 auditors can use this
acquired knowledge to consult as well. For example, the rule
limiting how much of a larger public company's internal audit
services may be performed by an outside accounting firm,"7
111. See EARNSCLIFFE, PHASE I, supra note 73.
112. See id.
113. See supra Part II.B.
114. See supra Part II.C.
115. See supra Part II.E.
116. See DEFLIESE ETAL., supra note 11.
117. See 17 C.F.R. § 210.2-01(c)(4)(v) (2001). Internal audits are audits, usu-
ally in more detail, but are solely for the benefit of the company. The scope of
an internal audit is more focused, for example on a single department. There
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means that an additional accounting firm will be required to
provide those services no longer being met by the first firm.
If the same firm was allowed to do both, many of the steps for
conducting the internal audit and the annual audit, as re-
quired by the SEC, must be done only once, thereby saving
the company time and money.
Another example of inefficiency occurs when a public
company decides to perform its own internal audits so as to
avoid strictures upon outsourcing internal audit services."'
By conducting the internal audit themselves, the cost would
be attributable to the lack of expertise that only the more ex-
perienced outside auditors can provide.
By preventing auditors from performing such non-audit
services, what problems are avoided? First, is the economic
relationship between auditor and client avoided? In other
words, can auditors avoid the risk of impaired judgment if the
audit client threatens to fire them because they do not agree
with all of the accounting policies or estimates? This risk
cannot be avoided because the client is paying the auditors
for the audit services. The economic relationship already ex-
ists.
Would the auditors' reputation cease to be at risk simply
because they are performing the additional service of an in-
ternal audit? No. Would the auditors cease to be at risk from
a lawsuit for performing any additional services to the audit
client? Again the answer is no. The auditors' reputation is at
risk and the auditor is subject to lawsuits brought by users of
the financial statements no matter what additional services
they perform.
Thus, the effect of the SEC's amendment is to keep audi-
tors from becoming more susceptible to influences than they
already are. Even though the amendments would prevent
these additional risks, the added costs of compliance outweigh
any benefit that might be gained.
Another example of inefficiency created by the new rules
is the prohibition on providing actuarial services."' An im-portant part of the audit is the review of estimates made by
are no independence requirements for internal audits. See DEFLIESE ET AL., su-
pra note 11.
118. See 17 C.F.R. § 210.2-01(c)(4)(v).
119. See 17 C.F.R. § 210.2-01(c)(4)(iv).
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management."' An example of this would be the estimates
relating to employee retirement plans or pension plans. In
order to determine the expense to record for such a plan, the
auditors need to know how long the company's employees will
live. '2 This is an actuarial determination, based on life ex-
pectancy, sex, current age and other factors.122 These types of
estimates can either be calculated by the auditors or by a
third party actuary services. 121 Under the new rules, the
auditors will be prevented from doing this actuarial estimate
except in limited circumstances.12 Again, the introduction of
a third party will increase costs by prohibiting efficiencies of
scale. The work done by the actuary will be duplicated by the




By preventing the auditors from performing this service,
are the auditors still subject to economic risk? Are their
reputations at stake? Are they at risk of being sued? The an-
swer is yes. Therefore, the new rules do not eliminate the
very incentives that the SEC believes impair auditor inde-
pendence.
C. The Auditors Paradox12 6
Because the amendments enacted by the SEC severely
limit accounting firms from performing a number of different
non-audit services, the SEC is forcing firms to be increasingly
dependent on audit fees for revenue.'27 This dependence on
audit revenues causes accounting firms to become more sus-
ceptible to economic influences and, arguably, less independ-
ent than before. The paradox is that the more you restrict the
120. See supra Part I.B.
121. See DEFLIESE ET AL., supra note 11.
122. See id.
123. See id.
124. See supra Part II.H.4.
125. See DEFLIESE ET AL., supra note 11.
126. A paradox is a "statement or sentiment that is seemingly contradictory
or opposed to common sense and yet perhaps is true." WEBSTERS' 3RD NEW
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1638 (3d ed. 1993).
127. By forcing accounting firms to derive a greater percentage of revenues
from auditing, the importance of audit revenues to the firm increases. As the
importance of audit revenues increases the greater the pressure will be to
please audit clients, and making it harder for auditors to make fully unbiased
decisions and to appear independent.
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amount of additional services an accounting firm can perform,
the more they become dependent on audit fees and less inde-
pendent of their clients. In essence, any economic interest an
auditor has in a client impairs independence. In fact, com-
mentaries to the SEC proposed regulations argued that "be-
cause Congress adopted this arrangement in enacting federal
securities laws, by choosing the statutory independence re-
quirements rather than creating a corps of government paid
auditors, Congress implicitly condoned these types of con-
flicts."128
D. Benefits of the SEC Amendments
Though the Earnscliffe Report tends to portray executive
officers, analysts, and the like, as having faith in the system
as it is today, there are growing concerns about the future.9
Many are worried that as earnings pressures increase and as
non-audit revenues become a significant percentage of total
revenues, failures will appear in the audit process due to im-
paired independence.
It is also important to note that not all of the amend-
ments related to non-audit services will have a negative im-
pact. Some changes are a positive step forward. In fact,
much of what the SEC included in its ruling codified inde-
pendence standards set by the private bodies such as the
AICPA.30 Some examples of this are the restrictions on bro-
ker-dealers ' and the restrictions on acting in management
functions.'32
V. PROPOSAL
A. A Need for Change
Based on the analysis above, the amendments to the in-
dependence rules will not prevent the loss of confidence in the
audit process. '  This is due to the auditor's paradox. The
128. Revision of the Commission's Auditor Independence Requirements, 65
Fed. Reg. 76,008, 76,015 (Dec. 5, 2000).
129. See supra Part 11.1.2.
130. See Revision of the Commission's Auditor Independence Requirements,
65 Fed. Reg. at 76,011.
131. See supra Part II.H.8.
132. See supra Part II.H.6.
133. See supra Part IV.
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general feeling from executives and analysts, however, is that
independence is a "work in process" and that there are "rea-
sons for concern."13 4 Therefore, we cannot leave independence
rules unchanged.
Instead of requiring audits by independent, private audi-
tors, annual audits should be performed by the government.
The government employs auditors in a number of different
agencies, such as in the Internal Revenue Service. Yearly
audits ought to be conducted by government employees that
have no financial interest in the companies they audit.
B. Lack of Financial Interest
By disconnecting the auditors from any financial interest
whatsoever, the inherent flaw in the current audit model is
eliminated. The auditors could be supplied by the SEC itself
or by an agency yet to be formed.
The agency could be funded by establishing statutory fees
based on hours incurred to perform the audit. Alternatively,
fees could be based on a measure related to the company's
size, such as total assets, or another benchmark. Through a
fixed fee model, the agency would be forced to act efficiently.
Any inefficiency by the agency (which is the usual criticism of
government agencies) would not be passed along to the com-
panies.
As an additional safeguard regarding fees, the agency
should be an independent establishment of the executive
branch similar to the U.S. Postal Service.135 This model gives
the governmental agency the freedom to be innovative, while
at the same time it shifts the economic burden away from the
average taxpayer.136
C. Actual Independence and the Appearance of Independence
Actual independence and apparent independence will be
134. See EARNSCLIFFE, PHASE I, supra note 73, at 19.
135. See 39 U.S.C.A. § 201 (West 2000).
136. See 62 AM. JUR. 2D Post Office § 5 (1990). The Post Office has certain
powers such as the ability to enter into contracts, execute instruments, and de-
termine the character of and necessity for its expenditures, to acquire, use and
dispose of real and personal property, to construct, use and lease buildings, fa-
cilities and other improvements on property, to exercise the right of eminent
domain and to have the debt priority of the United States. See id. Generally
the post office is run fiscally as a separate entity, in charge of its own revenues
and expenses. See id.
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ensured under this model because the auditors will have no
economic interest in the audited company whatsoever. No
longer will the threat of being fired be used to influence audi-
tor judgment. Except in situations of fraud or gross negli-
gence by the government, there should be no reason to doubt
the integrity and the objectivity of government auditors.
D. Less litigation
As an added benefit, using government auditors would
result in less litigation. If the SEC or other subsidiary agency
audits each company's financial statements, third party
plaintiffs will have a difficult time finding suitable grounds to
bring a suit against the government or the company (al-
though there will still be a need to litigate claims of gross
negligence or fraud). In essence, the financial statements will
be a kind of "safe harbor" for public companies. Cutting down
on litigation will save public companies from paying litigation
expenses. Reducing litigation will also allow company man-
agement to spend more time running their company.
E. Efficiencies Over The Current Audit Model
By switching to a regulatory model, some economies of
scale would still be gained. For example, companies currently
switch auditors to obtain a better price, or for a myriad of
other reasons. Changing auditors is an inefficiency that could
be eliminated if the government performed all auditing serv-
ices. Not only would companies save the time and money
they would spend looking for and interviewing new auditors,
they would also be spared the task of familiarizing the new
auditors with the company.
F. Financial Expertise
The strongest criticism against this proposal to move
auditing from the private sector to the public sector is the po-
tential loss of expertise. Some believe it would be unreason-
able and implausible to expect private companies to obtain
consulting services from the government. Critics fear that
government auditors would not be properly trained, nor have
the experience to provide consulting advice or perform addi-
tional services to public companies. Instead, they believe that
consulting and non-audit services would be best left to the
private sector.
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These objections are without merit. First, private com-
panies can perform any non-audit financial services a com-
pany needs. Secondly, current educational and certification
processes do not need to cease once the government takes
over auditing. As long as auditors are trained and certified as
Certified Public Accountants, the quality of audits should not
decrease.
G. Accounting Firms
This proposal has significant ramifications for accounting
firms. Substantial revenues are generated from audit fees.
Implementation of this proposal would force accounting firms
to limit their audit services to non-public companies and re-
quire them to concentrate their resources in other areas to
generate revenue. However, one significant benefit for the
accounting firms would be that they would be able to perform
any services they wished in addition to their tax services.
Therefore, what accounting firms would lose in audit revenue,
they would more than make up for by providing the addi-
tional services that the proposed rules would prevent.
If the proposed amendment is adopted, it is likely that
accounting firms would be forced to merge or form strategic
alliances with existing consulting firms. However, it is im-
portant to note that already today, three of the big five ac-
counting firms are already divesting their consulting prac-
tices because of scrutiny they received regarding
independence issues.'37
IV. CONCLUSION
There is no easy solution to auditor independence. The
best answer is to reform the entire system. The amendments
made by the SEC will not restore any lost confidence in the
existing system. There was no confidence to lose. Instead the
changes will prevent public companies from accessing the ex-
pertise that auditors offer. Secondly, they will force compa-
nies to pay for services the auditors already provide.
Restricting the services that private accounting firms
provide is an inefficient solution. Accounting firms act as any
business would, attempting to innovate and expand their
137. See Revision of the Commission's Auditor Independence Requirements,
65 Fed. Reg. 76,008, 76,013 (Dec. 5, 2000).
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services to generate increasing revenue. The SEC is only
harming this country's securities markets by imposing these
new restrictions on accounting firms.
Leaving the rules the way they were and thus allowing
the AICPA to set independence standards for the accounting
profession has been working well and investor confidence is
high as a result. However, if the opinions of those inter-
viewed in the Earnscliff Research study are indicative of the
investing public as a whole, waning confidence is a real threat
that needs to be addressed. This problem is directly linked to
the current systems model, whereby public companies hire
and pay accountants for independent audits.
The only real solution is to change the way audits are
performed. The government, either through the SEC or an-
other regulatory agency, should take on the responsibility of
performing the audits, thus eliminating the financial stake
that private auditors inherently have in the audit process.
This would effectively sever the link between consulting and
non-audit services in the private sector, and allow the gov-
ernment to have "independent" oversight over what public
companies report in their annual financial statements. The
only way to permanently fix this problem is to turn over the
role of auditing to the government, which has no financial in-
terest in public companies. Therefore, government audits of
public companies provide the only clear path to true audit in-
dependence.
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